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FROM Suzuki’s close associate, I heard of a Western admirer who one dayhad found his way to Suzuki’s Eastern Buddhist office at Otani University 
in the 1960s. Eager to discuss a point from a recent Suzuki article, the visitor 
pointed to a passage from that essay and produced a copy of another article 
from several years earlier in which Suzuki had said virtually the opposite. 
When he looked at the older text, Suzuki asked pointedly, “Did / write that?” 
The Suzuki of the 1960s was not the same as the Suzuki of the 1930s or 1940s 
or 1950s. So, why should one expect consistency in what the different Suzukis 
wrote? Mahayana Buddhism in general and Zen Buddhism in particular 
emphasize the spontaneity and fluidity of expression. This is the point of “sit­
uational effectiveness” (Jp. hoben Skt. upaya). The teacher adroitly 
adapts expression, both verbal and nonverbal, to the shifting conditions of 
context and audience. Indeed, we could even say that in this little exchange 
at Otani University, there were three Suzukis: the one from the 1950s who 
wrote the earlier essay, the one from some months before the encounter in 
Kyoto who had written the recent article, and the one engaging the visitor 
right then and there. The Westerner was ready to engage the ink spots on the 
page from the two essays, but was forgetting what Linji called “the true person 
without status,” living and breathing right there in that room.1
1 Suzuki wrote a book in Japanese about Linji’s view of the person, Suzuki 1949.
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This little episode is relevant to the concern of this paper. I want to suggest 
D. T. Suzuki’s corpus of writings2 may have something special to say to many 
of us in the twenty-first century. Of course, the significance of a text or even 
the corpus of a writer’s life-work only emerges from the engagement between 
the written page and its readers. The reader is inextricably part of a text’s 
import. An unread book is as devoid of significance as an unwritten one. When 
we evaluate the value of a book or its writer, therefore, we readers entangle 
our own perceptions, values, assumptions, and agendas into the letters of the 
text. Among his generation of Japanese intellectuals, Suzuki was probably 
unique in how often he wrote in English for an intended Western audience. 
Over his six or seven decades of writing in English, it is not surprising that 
he found his Western audience bringing to his expositions different questions 
and different assumptions. Responsive to the changes in his readership and 
their contexts, he could say different things. For example, Suzuki wrote more 
extensively about Zen Buddhism’s relation to “the unconscious” after his 
encounter with Erich Fromm3 in the 1960s than he did in the 1920s. This 
change was probably more a response to the shifting categories of his audience 
than a development in his own thought about Zen. In fact, I suspect in most 
ways D. T. Suzuki’s understanding of Zen did not change much at all in the 
last half of his life. Yet, even if he did not change, as long as his audience was 
changing, the purport of his writings was also changing. So, before consid­
ering Suzuki’s relevance to a twenty-first-century readership, let us consider 
some earlier contexts of reading Suzuki.
2 Throughout this article, I am focusing on the writings of Suzuki in English and their sig­
nificance for the intended audience of Western readers. This is particularly apropos because 
this article appears in the The Eastern Buddhist, the English-language journal Suzuki founded 
as a vehicle for reaching a Western audience. I also refer throughout to “D. T. Suzuki” rather 
than the Japanese “Suzuki Daisetz,” since the former was not only most often the name, but 
also, the persona of the man who wrote for Westerners. In other words, “Suzuki Daisetz” and 
“D. T. Suzuki” refer to the same man, but perhaps not always the same person, the same writer.
3 See Suzuki, Fromm, and DeMartino 1960.
In the first decades of the twentieth century, Suzuki’s English-language 
readership knew little of Asian religion and thought. To the extent his readers 
knew of Buddhism at all, it was mostly Theravada. Suzuki first came to the 
United States to accompany his Zen master, Shaku Soen (1859-1919), 
a participant in the World’s Parliament of Religions in 1893. Then, through 
Soen’s endorsement and encouragement, Suzuki returned for a more extended 
stay (1897-1909) under the sponsorship of Paul Carus. Paul Carus was the 
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founder of Open Court Press and editor of the philosophical journal, The 
Monist.4 *6, There are two aspects of this context influential on Suzuki’s writings 
from that time.
4 Carus had wanted Soen to collaborate with him, but the Zen master had to attend to his 
own disciples and his temple, Engakuji in Kamakura, Japan. When Suzuki arrived
instead, it seems Carus understood Suzuki to be more of an assistant than collaborator, having 
him work in the garden and doing menial office work for the publisher. As time went on, Carus 
began to see the value of Suzuki as an intellectual resource and collaborated more directly with 
him. The shift in this relationship is readily visible in the Carus-Suzuki correspondence pre­
served in the Carus archives at Southern Illinois University.
First, as a German philosopher who immigrated to the United States, Carus 
shared tendencies of the Euro-American intellectual climate of the time. Most 
importantly, with the British Pali Text Society, the London Buddhist Society, 
various Western Vedantin groups, the Theosophists, and the Transcendenta- 
lists, he shared orientalist assumptions about the “ancient wisdom of the 
East.” Like the others, he aided the translation of this ancient wisdom into 
Western languages. In the argot of today’s post-colonial cultural theorists, 
this made Asian culture an object for the gaze of the Western eye. The “ancient 
wisdom of the East” was a culturally constructed object of desire for the 
Western orientalist.
More needs to be said, however. For many orientalists, this desire was not 
simply a libidinal appetite for titillation and control, but was also the respect­
ful aspiration to emulate. We find such an aspiration in the youth who watch­
es a great athlete and then goes to the playground day after day trying to imitate 
those moves. We find it in the college student who decides to become a scholar 
after taking an exciting seminar or hearing a provocative lecture. Carus’s 
brand of orientalism linked itself to a thirst for personal spiritual transforma­
tion. For readers like Carus, the hope was that Westerners could learn from, 
as well as about, Asian thought. Throughout the rest of his life, I think, Suzuki 
tried to quench that thirst in his audience.
The second aspect of this early context for Suzuki’s English writings was 
that from the start he saw himself as representing or even promoting Zen 
Buddhism in the West. After all, he came to America not as a scholar, but as 
a Zen master’s student. To a great extent, especially in his English writings, 
he never abandoned that persona. This set him apart from many contempo­
raries. For example, Anesaki Masaharu ®iWlE?n (1873-1949) also sometimes 
wrote in English, but his goal was different. He hoped to launch the field of 
religious studies in Japan and he wrote in English as a scholar of religion with 
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expertise in Japanese Buddhism.5 The significance of this contrast is that 
although Suzuki’s Western readers often thought of him as a Japanese scholar 
of Buddhism, that is not how he originally understood himself, particular as 
a writer in English. Suzuki was not a formally trained buddhologist. He 
studied more on his own than in the academy. He was the student of a Zen 
master, not the deshi of a professor.
5 Anesaki’s most famous books in English are Anesaki 1916 and Anesaki 1930.
These two aspects of Suzuki’s early context in the West presented special 
challenges. His orientalist supporters undoubtedly recognized differences 
among the various Asian civilizations in areas like language and history, for 
instance. Yet, when it came to the “ancient wisdom of the East,” they often 
blurred Asia into a seamless whole. To them, Vedanta and (Theravada) Bud­
dhism, the Bhagavad Gita and the Daodejing all pointed to the same 
transcendent reality and outlined basically the same program for spiritual 
transformation. This was a conundrum for Suzuki as an advocate of Zen 
Buddhism, a tradition about which his early readers knew almost nothing. On 
one hand, to catch the attention of his target audience, Suzuki had to make 
Zen fit the “ancient wisdom of the East” model. On the other hand, if he were 
going to promote Zen specifically, he had to convince that same audience that 
Zen was somehow special.
Suzuki’s tactic was to begin with a distinction his audience already knew 
of: the difference between Mahayana and Theravada. Most scholars and intel­
lectuals of the time had understood this difference mainly as a distinction 
between two kinds of Indian Buddhism, a Sanskrit tradition and Pali tradi­
tion. In writing about Mahayana, however, Suzuki could explicitly bring East 
Asian Buddhism into the analysis. His translation, Awakening of Faith in the 
Mahayana, appeared in 1900 and his Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism in 
1907. This opened a space within which he could begin introducing the West 
to Zen. This was one purpose for his founding, upon returning to Japan, The 
Eastern Buddhist Society and the English-language journal, The Eastern 
Buddhist. By shifting his terminology from “Mahayana Buddhism” to “East­
ern Buddhism,” he was explicitly moving his discourse more directly into 
East Asia and more pointedly to the easternmost part of East Asia: Japan. 
Through his contacts with America, including the networking enabled by his 
wife, Beatrice Lane Suzuki, he could promote the further eastward expansion 
of Zen across the Pacific to America.
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By the 1920s, Japan had assumed a more visible role in global geo-politics. 
From as far back as the nineteenth-century European japonisme fad in paint­
ing, there had been a Western fascination with Japanese arts, an early outlet 
for Western orientalism. Japan’s prominence as a modernizing Asian state in 
the 1920s, however, deepened the interest of many Westerners. In response, 
Suzuki could expand his Western readership from those interested in spiritual 
matters to those who wanted to know more about Japan, especially from a 
cultural or aesthetic point of view. Suzuki told this new audience that if you 
want to understand Japanese culture, you have to understand Zen. This was 
the context for his writing in English Zen Buddhism and its Influence on 
Japanese Culture in 1938.6 Eventually, though, as hostilities between Japan 
and the West increased, Suzuki’s visibility in the West diminished. In fact, 
during the Pacific War, he wrote almost exclusively in Japanese for his com­
patriots.
6 This first edition, Suzuki 1938, was published in Japan by The Eastern Buddhist Society. 
In the 1959 edition, Princeton University Press published a new version for the Bollingen Foun- 
dation with the title Zen and Japanese Culture, Suzuki 1959.
The postwar period brought to Suzuki personal renown and success in his 
promotion of Zen Buddhism. His English-language books, many out of print 
or published only in Japan, were reissued by Western publishers. His influ­
ence spread throughout the West, but particularly in the United States. This 
American focus was not coincidental. Of course, from earlier in the century, 
Suzuki had strong contacts in the United States. Just as importantly, however, 
was the emergence of a yet another audience for his writings. Here, the rela­
tion between the United States and Japan in the decade after the war is cru­
cial. First, the pacification agenda of the Occupation of Japan was remarkably 
successful. Further, the Occupation meant that a large number of American 
soldiers resided in Japan. Thus, personal exposure to Japan was no longer lim­
ited to the wealthy and privileged, but was open to a broader American demo­
graphic. This was accompanied by Cold War politics and the Korean conflict, 
which brought more American military personnel to Japan, a bonanza for 
Japan’s struggling economy. The common result of these factors was that, 
from 1945 to 1955, Japan went from America’s arch-enemy to becoming an 
American ally serving as the Asian model for successful democratic capital­
ism.
At that point in history, it was in the interest of both Japan and the United 
States to reverse the trajectory of wartime propaganda into the rhetoric of
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mutual respect and appreciation. The situation called for cultural ambassadors 
from Japan who could communicate with Americans and represent the soft, 
aesthetic, spiritual side of Japan to their new friends. Suzuki fit the bill 
perfectly and enthusiastically. Meanwhile, some military-trained American 
translators like Donald Keene and Edwin Seidensticker stayed on in Japan 
after their service ended and became the core of a brilliant cadre of transla­
tors who created a boom of American interest in Japanese literature. Liter­
ature, the arts, and Suzuki-style Zen spirituality became the new face of Japan 
in the United States by the late 1950s and into the 1960s.
Simultaneously, America’s dizzying economic prosperity of the late 1940s 
and 1950s brought suburbanization, home ownership, higher education, and 
economic security to a class of Americans who had only known hardship 
when growing up during the Great Depression. As war veterans, many had 
learned to be disciplined participants in a hierarchical organization. So, they 
were ideal workers for the new corporate world of the postwar economy. By 
working hard, they reaped the benefits of the newly enfranchised great middle 
class in America. As this cohort reached middle age in the 1960s, however, 
many felt that they had missed something. It seemed they had served some 
huge organization or other throughout their whole lives. Where was creativity 
and individuality? Had they sold their soul to “the system?” The “man in the 
grey-flannel suit,” caught up in “the rat race,” had become part of the “lonely 
crowd.” By the 1960s, theologians like Alan Watts and humanistic psycho­
analysts like Erich Fromm addressed this spiritual longing. When doing so, 
they found Suzuki, both the person and the writer, to be a useful resource.
Meanwhile, in the late 1960s, many children of the veterans—the baby 
boomers of the white middle class—were going off to “find themselves” in 
college or hippie communes. Raised in affluence, they saw the lack of free 
expression in their parents ’ lives and sought the gratification of personal soul- 
searching and spontaneous expression. “Consciousness-altering” became a 
slogan of the day. Some pursued this in the new drug culture, some in alter­
native spiritualities based in meditation, and some in the leftist project of rais­
ing class consciousness. With its link to artistic creativity, the freedom from 
dogmatic rigidity, and the emphasis on spontaneity, Suzuki’s characterization 
of Zen fit the recipe they sought. The beat writers of the late 1950s and early 
1960s had already opened the door to Zen in America, but a new generation 
of Americans was ready to pass through it on its own. Some even went to 
Japan to experience Zen first-hand.
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This overall situation had a remarkable impact on American academe. 
Detached from their parents’ experience of hard economic times, the baby 
boomers did not see higher education as mere preparation for the job market. 
Unlike their fathers’ generation who had gone to college on the GI Bill to get 
ahead in their careers, the baby boomers thought of college as a time to de­
velop their personal interests and their needs, not the needs of corporate 
America or the military. The crisis of conscience, as well as the suspicion 
about what President Eisenhower had dubbed the “military-industrial com­
plex,” escalated with the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. These factors 
together led to a student demand that education be revamped to serve as an 
agent for social change, rather than to serve as a buttress for the social-eco­
nomic-political status quo. Across the country, students wanted colleges to 
offer courses in Asian religions, especially Buddhism. The Buddhism that 
most students had heard about was the Zen of the beat writers and Alan Watts. 
Both held D. T. Suzuki to be the font of wisdom.
The situation was now almost the reverse of what it had been when Suzuki 
first came to the United States to work with Paul Carus. Zen was no longer 
to most Americans the unknown Asian tradition, but instead the very para­
digm for the “ancient wisdom of the East.” Furthermore, to the college stu­
dents of the 1960s and early 1970s, Zen had the double attraction of not only 
being a path to personal transformation, but also an adversary to the military­
industrial complex and the values of materialist capitalism. To many, it did 
not go unnoticed that the site of Western aggression was Vietnam, a Buddhist 
country. For the students of the 1960s and early 1970s, to value Buddhism 
was to protest against the interests and ideology of the military-industrial 
complex and capitalist imperialism.
By this process, Buddhist studies—despite the miniscule number of Bud­
dhists living in America—became a significant academic field in the United 
States. It was no longer an arcane specialty found only at major research uni­
versities where a single professor of Buddhist studies had an office next to 
the token Egyptologist and the resident scholar of Zoroastrianism. Because 
of student demand, Buddhist studies became an area every large religious 
studies program tried to include. Every professor in the university, regardless 
of specialty, had heard of Zen Buddhism and D. T. Suzuki.
Of course, most students were interested in enrolling in only a course or 
two in Buddhist studies. Yet, a number of bright and eager undergraduates 
decided they wanted to specialize in the field for graduate work. In this way, 
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at many universities where libraries could support it (such as Berkeley, 
UCLA, Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Chicago, Wisconsin, and Michigan), Bud­
dhist studies became a department or at least a free-standing degree program 
unto itself. Such institutions often trained the “buddhologists” who would 
teach those courses now required in so many religious studies programs in 
various colleges and universities around the country. Many Western bud­
dhologists in training, especially those interested in East Asian Buddhism, 
also spent at least some time studying in Japan, the world’s epicenter of philo­
logical and historicist buddhology. Many had read every word of Suzuki’s 
writings and went to Japan with not only an academic interest, but also a wish 
to experience Zen practice first-hand.
They found that most Japanese knew little or nothing about Zen and not 
much more about Buddhism in general. The American exchange students 
wondered whether these Japanese had read Suzuki’s Zen and Japanese Cul­
ture. How could they be Japanese and not know or care about Zen? In the 
zendo these students found their Japanese colleagues were there mainly 
because they were the sons of Zen priests and were meeting their obligation 
to carry on the family business. Had these monks not read Suzuki’s The 
Training of the Zen Buddhist Monk? Even the Zen masters seldom matched 
the expectations derived from Suzuki’s accounts of the spiritually charismatic 
masters of history. Still, one could have concluded that Zen had merely degen­
erated from the heights of its golden age. Maybe Zen was simply not being 
authentic to its glorious history and traditions. There was much talk that Zen 
could perhaps be revived in the West.
Then came the final blow, a thwack louder, sharper, and more painful than 
could be rendered by any kydsaku in the meditation hall. It came in the 
buddhology classroom and in the university library. It turned out that the 
history of Zen characterized by Suzuki was full of omissions, distortions, and 
outright falsehoods. Yes, Suzuki’s account followed the traditional one 
handed down by the Zen schools, but he already knew some of that account 
was historically inaccurate.7 That is, he continued to follow the traditional 
7 In fact, Suzuki wrote in his preface to Essays in Zen Buddhism: Second Series that he 
would soon undertake the writing ofEssays in Zen Buddhism: Fourth Series and that the general 
topic of that work would be to incorporate new information about the history of Zen as gleaned 
from the Dunhuang texts. “In the Fourth Series I intend to write a new history of Chinese Zen 
as can be gathered up from the documents thus made accessible to us.” (See Suzuki 1933, p. 
vii.) During the years of the Pacific War, when Suzuki wrote almost exclusively in Japanese 
for a Japanese readership, he did undertake some significant rewriting of early Zen history. He
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narrative even where he must have known it was not true. Some young 
Western buddhologists in training must have felt betrayed. The man who had 
instilled their initial interest in Buddhism and especially Zen Buddhism had 
knowingly portrayed a Zen Buddhism that never really existed, neither in the 
past nor the present. When they returned to Suzuki’s texts, they read them 
with new eyes. Their new perspective constituted yet another reading of 
Suzuki in the 1980s and 1990s.
Needing a critical theory to interpret the situation, these new readers (actu­
ally re-readers) of Suzuki found resources in the methods of their colleagues 
from other fields, especially literary studies. Specifically, the new buddhol­
ogists discovered various forms of post-structuralism and the post-modern 
critiques of the ideologies of power and authority. When used to interrogate 
the traditional narrative of Zen, these theoretical approaches became incisive 
tools for explaining why Zen had constructed its history as it had done. It 
revealed the regimes of rhetoric and power that made these histories hege­
monic within the tradition and lent them institutional authority up to the pre­
sent day. Some interpretations pushed the analysis even further to claim that 
the foundational notions in East Asian Buddhism like satori *9, no-mind, 
and Buddha nature were empty rhetorical constructs referring to nothing real. 
One could elicit Derrida’s theories about logocentrism and deconstruction­
ism, for example, to support a claim that there is and can be no such thing as 
nonconceptual experience. If that claim is valid, then not only the writings of 
D. T. Suzuki, but also Zen Buddhism in general, are a con game. That is, Zen 
terms are ciphers or empty signifiers used only to reinforce the authority of 
the Zen institution and the master’s power over his disciples. This interpreta­
tion dovetails, in this way, with Foucault’s analysis of power, discipline, and 
authority.
Extending this further, theories about the ideology of fascism, ultranation­
alism, and totalitarianism come into play in some interpretations of Suzuki. 
From this standpoint, Suzuki bought into the Japanese militarism and ethno­
centrism of his time. We can find this in passages where he wrote about Zen’s 
bringing us to a point “beyond good and evil.” He even wrote that when the 
samurai’s sword strikes with no-mind, it is not made impure by the blood it 
spills. Suzuki spoke of a “Japanese spirituality” that could serve as a model 
for the whole world. In this regard, Suzuki can be grouped with those members
did not, however, ever write the proposed book in English and his writings in English after the 
war did not reflect this revised early Zen history.
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of the philosophical Kyoto School who argued for “pure experience” and the 
“nothingness” at the ground of “acting-intuition.”8 Such analyses, the inter­
pretation goes, supported the lack of moral reflection about Japan’s actions 
during the war and obscured the responsibility of those who participated and 
supported those efforts.9
Such is the direction of many scholarly readings of Suzuki for the past cou­
ple of decades or so. Not surprisingly, in Buddhism courses taught in America
8 For an excellent analysis of the Kyoto School and its involvement in the wartime ideology 
of the state from different perspectives, see the essays collected in Heisig and Maraldo 1995. 
There are three essays in this collection that are particularly relevant to interpreting the issue 
of Suzuki and Japanese nationalism. Christopher Ives (pp. 16-49), in his “Ethical Pitfalls in 
Imperial Zen and Nishida Philosophy: Ichikawa Hakugen’s Critique,” focuses on Ichikawa’s 
critique of nationalism, including the way it was supported by Suzuki’s “logic of sokuhi.” Ives 
also analyzes the nationalistic assumptions inherent in Suzuki’s idea of “Japanese spirituality,” 
emphasizing the dualistic (and tendentious) way Suzuki elaborated on the spiritual/philo- 
sophical differences between “East” and “West.” Ives’ critique deftly shows the ethnocen­
trism lurking in the rhetoric and philosophical assumptions behind Suzuki’s general account 
of Japanese spirituality.
Kirita Kiyohide’s contribution (pp. 52-74), “D. T. Suzuki on Society and the State,” is a 
restricted defense of Suzuki based on his published and, importantly, unpublished writings and 
letters. Kirita’s point is that, however nationalistic some of Suzuki’s philosophical or cultural 
assumptions might seem, the evidence is overwhelming that Suzuki did not support Japan’s 
militaristic and imperialistic ventures. Although Suzuki’s public criticisms of the government 
were guarded for fear of retaliation, in his private correspondence, he was outspoken in his dis­
gust for the militarist and imperialist takeover of Japanese politics.
John C. Maraldo’s chapter (pp. 333-62), “Questioning Nationalism Now and Then: A 
Critical Approach to Zen and the Kyoto School,” casts a new light and more subtle shading 
on the issue of Suzuki’s nationalism and his idea of Japanese spirituality. Maraldo shows that 
Suzuki’s discourse was, first, primarily aimed at a Japanese, not Western, audience. In the wan­
ing years of the war, Suzuki was arguing that Japan’s real contribution to the world was not 
military or political, but spiritual and cultural. Further, Maraldo points out that Suzuki chose 
to distinguish the term he preferred for “spirit,” namely, reisei Sit, from the term more com­
monly used in state ideology: seishin Wi#. In his way, Maraldo shows, Suzuki was arguing 
against the state notion of “spirit” while posing an alternative way to appreciate “Japanese 
spirituality.” Nevertheless, because Suzuki was arguing specifically for a Japanese spirituality, 
his analysis still maintained an ethnocentric rhetoric. This is more forgivable when the audience 
was Japanese and Suzuki was trying to shift the Japanese sense of national identity away from 
militarism. Yet, as Ives also demonstrates in his chapter, this rhetoric continued in Suzuki’s 
English-language writings in the last fifteen years of his life.
9 Such a reading of Zen, the Kyoto School, and Suzuki is not limited to Western buddhol- 
ogists, incidentally. The Japanese “critical Buddhism” school of scholarship shares the same 
basic analysis. For a good sampling of its views in English, see Hubbard and Swanson 1997. 
50
KASULIS: READING D. T. SUZUKI TODAY
by buddhologically trained scholars, Suzuki’s writings have disappeared from 
the syllabus. I myself do not have students read Suzuki in my Buddhism 
courses. This brings us to the more difficult question, however: where do we 
go from here? Since no one in the know reads Suzuki any more for insights 
into Buddhist history, why continue to write about how he was wrong? There 
certainly remains the almost endless historical project of sorting out who col­
laborated with the rise of Japanese militarism and how they did so. Yet, at 
least from the standpoint of Zen Buddhism, the basics of the story are now 
quite well researched and explained.10 To continue the critique further seems 
more like a hermeneutics of resentment than a hermeneutics of suspicion. If 
Suzuki was the Buddha authority for the 1960s and 1970s, we have followed 
Linji’s advice: “if you meet a Buddha, kill him.” Is there need to keep stab­
bing the body? We have learned immensely from critical theory’s take on Zen 
and Suzuki. But the obituary is written; it is old news. There is now some­
thing hypocritical in accusing Suzuki for lacking the courage to stand up 
against the ideology of his age, while we simply follow the post-modern, post­
colonial, and post-structural ideologies of our age in criticizing him.11 *iSCan 
we muster the courage ourselves to kill the authority of Foucault and kill the 
deconstructionism of Derrida?
10 For specifics of how particular Zen masters (and D. T. Suzuki) were involved in the mil­
itary effort, see the thorough analysis in Victoria 1997.
11 Indeed, the hypocrisy is all the stronger when we weigh the stakes. People who today dare
criticize fashionable modes of au courant theory may not get the academic position or awards
they covet. People who criticized the Japanese state ideology in the 1930s and 1940s could
well end up spending the rest of their lives in prison. This happened to both Tosaka Jun F®
iS (1900-1945) andMiki Kiyoshi A/MS (1897-1945). Tosaka and Miki were members of the 
Kyoto School who, despite the popular theory today that the Kyoto School philosophy 
inevitably leads to fascism, were noted leftists and critics of the state.
So, the question is whether there might be yet another way to read Suzuki 
today, one that does not merely reinforce our own ideological and method­
ological assumptions about the rhetoric of power and authority. Instead of our 
challenging Suzuki, is there a way he can still challenge us? Can Suzuki 
address yet another readership and thereby have something new and impor­
tant to say? I have no definitive answer to these questions, but in the remainder 
of this paper, I will at least try to open up the discussion. My comments will 
be completely personal: I am not making any attempt to claim that I have a 
definitive way to capture Suzuki’s significance. I am not approaching Suzuki 
as a scholar approaching a scholar. Nor am I going to take him too literally 
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in the words he uses. Those are ink spots on the page and Suzuki could always 
respond with “Did I say that?” (To whom? When? Under what circum­
stances? Are those the circumstances we share right here and wow?)
To engage Suzuki, I will begin with some correctives on his rhetoric. Let 
us, at least as a thought experiment, assume that if he could have read his 
critics from the past two decades, he might today say some things quite dif­
ferently. He would adjust to his new audience. Of course, since Suzuki has 
been dead for some four decades, we will have to make the adjustments for 
him. First of all, we will change his phrase “Japanese spirituality” to “Suzuki 
spirituality.” Let us do to Suzuki what he did for Meister Eckhart in 1957 
when he wrote the book, Mysticism Christian and Buddhist: The Eastern and 
Western Way. That is, he spoke of Eckhart’s mysticism as “Christian” but 
also as “unique.” Therefore, he felt no compulsion to determine whether 
Eckhart’s view was “really Christian.” Let us consider Suzuki spirituality, 
therefore, to be “unique” in a similar way. That is, let us take Suzuki as rep­
resenting Suzuki spirituality and ignore claims (including his own as directed 
to his earlier audiences) about whether the spirituality he advocates is really 
“Zen Buddhist,” “Mahayana Buddhist,” “Eastern” (rather than “Western”), 
or “Japanese.” If we can take Suzuki spirituality in this way, do any of his 
claims capture our attention today? I think they can.
First, Suzuki spirituality mistrusts any form of religion that blindly follows 
tradition and orthodoxy without personal, experiential confirmation. He used 
his characterization of the history of Zen to argue that Zen refutes claims to 
either orthodoxy or orthopraxis for its authenticity. Because we are engaging 
Suzuki spirituality instead of Zen spirituality, we need not concern ourselves 
with the historical accuracy of this claim. We are more interested in what he 
was using that claim to support or exemplify: that orthodoxy and tradition can 
kill the life of spirituality.
Second, Suzuki maintained that his brand of spirituality is based in a non­
conceptualized experience, that there is an experience more spiritually pri­
mary and foundational than what any doctrine or conceptual scheme can 
articulate. In this vein, we find Suzuki’s references to “no-mind,” “nothing­
ness,” “Suchness,” and “emptiness.” Suzuki was usually clear in insisting 
these terms were not naming something, but were rather ciphers used to indi­
cate unnameability. Unfortunately, he sometimes also loosely borrowed ter­
minology of the Kyoto School and philosophized about the relation between 
this experience of “emptiness” and conceptualization. That is, he tried to 
explain philosophically how Suchness or emptiness functions either cogni­
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tively or even metaphysically. Here, he was out of his element. Suzuki was 
no philosopher, a point obvious to many Western philosophers and a reason 
why they generally ignored him. By contrast, because they resonated most with 
the experiential side of his claims, Western theologians and humanistic psy­
chologists found his work provocative and useful in their own projects. For our 
re-reading of Suzuki, we will accept his claims about nonconceptualized expe­
rience without necessarily accepting his problematic philosophical excursions.
Suzuki’s claim about the possibility of nonconceptualized experience can 
be a stumbling block to many present-day readers. Many may assume that 
contemporary French theory has proven there is no “primordially given,” 
thereby rejecting what Husserl claimed in his phenomenology. In the ideology 
of this critical theory, the assumption is that experience is always—down to 
its ground—determined within a conceptual frame. Some Western philoso­
phers of religious mysticism also reject the possibility of nonconceptual 
mystical experience on other grounds, usually assuming what cannot be artic­
ulated cannot be experienced. This is not the place to develop a detailed argu­
ment in support of the reality of nonconceptual experience, but, for our 
purposes, we need only point out this is very much a controversial point. In 
any case, we should at least concede that if there is such an experience, neu­
rologists have already discovered some likely physiological correlates. To 
take one example, there is the neurological phenomenon called “blindsight.” 
This occurs when a person has suffered damage to the back portion of the 
brain where visual conceptualization occurs, but the visual nervous system 
(eye, optic nerve, visual center in the brain) is intact and fully functional. 
People with blindsight will insist they are “blind” and cannot see anything. 
Yet, using visual sensation, they can walk across an unfamiliar crowded room 
without bumping into anything or anyone else. At the end of the event, the 
people will continue to insist they cannot see and have no idea how they were 
able to do what they had just done. They typically say that they “just guessed” 
where to go.12 In other neurological experiments that have been replicated in 
multiple contexts,13 advanced Zen meditators show unusual patterns in 
12 For the basic neuroscience of blindsight, see Weiskrantz 1986. For a study of the philo­
sophical significance of blindsight, see Holt 2003. For a philosophical analysis of a broader 
range of issues related to nonconceptual experience, see the essays in Gunther 2003 and 
Bermudez 2003.
13 For experiments done at Kyushu University and Komazawa University in Japan, see 
Akishige 1977. For a detailed overview and interpretation of studies performed mainly in the 
West, see Austin 1998.
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activating and de-activating parts of the brain. Some of these locations are 
associated with general conceptualizing functions and others with specific 
functions correlated with, for example, the sense of “I” or self-identity. There­
fore, for our re-reading of Suzuki, when it comes to the possibility of noncon­
ceptualized experience, it is reasonable to go along with what the neurological 
empirical evidence suggests over against the unverifiable claims of decon­
structionist theory.
Third, by insisting on the importance of nonconceptualized experience as 
foundational, Suzuki argued for the centrality of meaninglessness in spiritu­
ality. That is, although lacking meaning, nonconceptual experience is pivotal 
in his version of spirituality. Although Suzuki did not explicitly talk about 
“meaninglessness,” his terminology of “no-mind,” “emptiness,” and “no­
thought” points in this direction. Without concepts, there technically can be 
no “meaning.” This stress on meaninglessness lies behind Suzuki’s admira­
tion for Eckhart’s emphasis on the Godhead and on creation ex nihilo. It is 
also visible in Suzuki’s respect for Shin Buddhist spirituality (Suzuki 1970 
and 1998). In his interpretation, Shin makes the binary distinction between 
self-power (Jiriki g dj) and Other Power (tariki as a means of getting 
to the point of the non-bifurcated natural function of the just-so (Jinen honi 
f/AzS). Thus, Shin spirituality uses conceptual opposition to reach a point 
where the meanings of the terms and their distinctions dissolve. Whether 
writing about Zen, Eckhart, or Shin, Suzuki appreciated a spirituality that 
embraced, rather than eliminated, meaninglessness.
The fourth point is a corollary to the third: Suzuki spirituality must be 
enacted rather than described or thought. Suzuki reiterates this idea con­
tinually with his use of Zen stories about the interactions between Zen mas­
ters and their students. (Again, for our new reading, we do not concern 
ourselves with the historicity and accuracy of these accounts. We only focus 
on Suzuki’s point in relating them.) For Suzuki spirituality, Nanyang 
Huizhong’s statement that “no-mind” (Ch. wuxin ST') is “functioning mind” 
(Ch. yongxin Thu), f°r example, suggests that meaninglessness is openness 
to creative performance. Fixed meanings filter our experience in ways that 
make us responsive to our preconceived categories but closed to engaging 
what is right in front of us. Herein lies Suzuki’s challenge to us as new readers 
of his texts.
To sum up: Suzuki argues that at the core of his brand of spirituality is an 
acceptance of a meaninglessness that is both experienced nonconceptually 
and enacted creatively. In his accounts of Zen and Shin Buddhism, Suzuki 
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shows this meaninglessness can be reached via two routes. One route is to 
establish conceptual oppositions that one works through until they dissolve 
into meaninglessness. Zen koan and the Shin dichotomy of self-power and 
Other Power work spiritually in this way. The other route is to cut off con­
ceptualization at the core and to enter directly into meaninglessness via med­
itation or contemplation. This is the path of zazen and Eckhart.
To lend circularity to this essay and to bring us back to what is right in front 
of us, we can use these two routes to meaninglessness as ways of reading 
Suzuki’s own texts on spirituality. The objective of reading a spiritual text is 
to open it up, to go beyond the ink spots on its page and on the pages of the 
commentaries about it. When a text has its meanings cast in stone, it is as dead 
as an epitaph on a tombstone. To be alive, a text has to be capable of always 
saying something new. Let us examine Suzuki’s two routes for doing this.
One way to do this is to attack the standard readings, to establish polarities 
between what the text inscribes and what it erases. This exposes previous 
interpretations for what they are: the specific agenda of a particular readership 
who used its authority to try to control the meaning of the text. As we have 
seen, from the 1980s up to today, contemporary critical theory has given us 
a standpoint from which we can interrogate all Zen texts, including Suzuki’s. 
Through this reading, we have found that the emperor has no clothes or at 
least the Zen master has no robe. As Linji prescribes, we have “seen the 
Buddha and killed him.” What we do next, however, is crucial if we are to 
engage the text spiritually in Suzuki’s sense.
The deconstructive reading of the Zen tradition is just that—it is an wrcread- 
ing of the way the tradition (and Suzuki) has told us to read Zen spirituality. 
It is not really a new reading of the situation. If we go no further than the 
deconstruction, if we go no further than the disrobing of the Zen Buddhas and 
patriarchs, we are left picking through the cast-off rags on the floor. We never 
return to the Zen masters themselves. Yet, they stand before us naked and 
unadorned. To see the Zen masters in this way is embarrassing. Without their 
accoutrements of authority, they appear just as they are. They are, as Linji 
says, “skin bags of raw flesh.” They are human beings; they are just like us. 
What, then, if we meet them likewise, freely casting off our own fashionable 
garb, dropping away the Parisian theories in which we clothe ourselves as the 
authorities about authority? What if we deconstruct our deconstruction of 
Suzuki’s writings? Devoid of our theories of meaninglessness, we come face- 
to-face with meaninglessness itself. This can be a creative moment out of 
which a new reading emerges. So, this is the first way of reading a spiritual 
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text. It is oppositional, dualistic, and logical. But if pushed far enough, it ends 
up in a meaningless openness pregnant with creativity.
The other way of reading a spiritual text is what Suzuki thinks of as the 
direct encounter with meaninglessness. It is harmonizing, unitary, and affec­
tive right from the start. One dives directly into the nonconceptual until a new 
modality of experience and enactment opens up. From this standpoint, the 
text cannot be read without that primal experience. Thus, Suzuki gives kdan 
after koan to prove the Zen text is unreadable. The reason to read the Zen tra­
dition, even the reason to read Suzuki, is to remind ourselves that we do not 
understand and cannot understand through further reading and analysis. 
Therefore, we would read Suzuki to remind us we should not be reading any­
one, even Suzuki. For this approach, without first experiencing meaningless­
ness, reading is futile. One cannot explain such an experience, but can only 
enact it. If one does that, the Zen tradition becomes not the library of study, 
but the playground of creativity.
How then should we read Suzuki today? There seem to be two approaches 
to Suzuki spirituality. We can push further from the deconstructive reading 
of Suzuki to a deconstruction of our deconstruction. Or we could simply 
engage in Zen practice and wait for the point of entry to open up to us, for­
getting all previous interpretations and hermeneutical standpoints. For many 
literary texts, indeed probably for the majority of them, we do not need to 
dwell on such complexities. For example, we may give a book or an article a 
quick read, even a careful read, with no broader intent than to accumulate 
information. In such cases, critical reflection need not go beyond evaluating 
the reliability and perspective of the writer. This is probably the way to read 
most buddhological texts, for instance. Other books—leisure reading, for 
instance—may be just for immediate amusement, distraction, or edification. 
In such cases, we may forget the book almost as fast as we can turn its pages.
There are still other texts, though, that linger in our cultural consciousness 
over the years and we, in our lifetimes, find ourselves returning to them. Or 
we note that others from a younger generation see them anew. Such texts are 
classics. A classic is a work whose last chapter is always written by its readers. 
Those last chapters will change in some ways with each new generation, with 
each new audience. It may be that Suzuki’s works are such classics. If so, if 
we dare give him another reading, we may be able to free ourselves from the 
attachment to the ink spots on the page. Then we might recognize the true 
person without status breathing in and out of the skin bag of raw flesh and 
exclaim, with Linji, “It’s alive!”
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